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This paper is an examination of the in￿ uence of an individual￿ s self-con￿dence (over-
con￿dence or undercon￿dence) on others in the marriage market. We consider a model
in which there are three types of men and women according to marital charm, and some
men/women overestimate/underestimate their own types. The result obtained is that the
self-con￿dence of some single individuals a⁄ects not only themselves but also the marital
behavior of other rational singles in the market. Furthermore, self-con￿dence improves
the welfare of the economy if there are enough undercon￿dent men/women or if there are
su¢ ciently few overcon￿dent men/women in the marriage market.
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11 Introduction
Self-con￿dence (overcon￿dence or undercon￿dence) has been mainly researched in the ￿eld
of psychology. For example, the classical psychological study of overcon￿dence is that by
Svenson (1981), in which he reports that 88% of U.S. subjects overestimate themselves relative
to others in the safety of their driving. Moreover, Baker and Emery (1993) show that people
overestimate the likelihood of success in their marriage.
In economics, the concept of self-con￿dence has spread in recent years. Dubra (2004)
analyzes the role of overcon￿dence in a labor search problem. He shows that overcon￿dent
agents tend to search longer since they overestimate their chances of ￿nding a better of-
fer. Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) investigate su¢ cient conditions for the appearance of a
positive/negative self-image in subjective assessments of ability in a skill acquisition model.
K￿szegi (2006) shows how overcon￿dence regarding the appropriateness of a task occurs when
individuals choose a task. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) demonstrate that, if tasks are easy
(di¢ cult) and familiar (unfamiliar), individuals tend to be overcon￿dent (undercon￿dent) of
their relative skill in experimental situations.
In this paper, we investigate the in￿ uence of self-con￿dence on the marital pattern in the
marriage market.1 In the marriage market, it is likely that overcon￿dence and undercon￿-
dence exist: some people often overestimate/underestimate their market value when they seek
a marital partner. In much of the marriage literature, an individual is assumed to choose a
marriage partner based on his/her charm (type). Since charm is de￿ned by various elements,
including quality, attraction, intelligence, height, age, education, and family background, the
meaning of the word ￿charm￿might carry some ambiguity. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) re-
port, using a verbal experiment, that self-con￿dence arises more easily when it is di¢ cult for
agents to interpret the meaning of the word.2 Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) show that, when
di⁄erent people have di⁄erent opinions about how skills determine ability, a subjective pos-
itive/negative self-image arises. Although they mainly analyze positive/negative self-image
in a skill acquisition model, we can apply the same logic to our marriage market model.3.
We consider the framework of Burdett and Coles (1997), which is two-sided search model.
There are ex-ante heterogeneous singles in the marriage market. It is assumed that all singles
in the market know the distribution of the type (charm) of each sex correctly in the marriage
market. However, we assume that some people are overcon￿dent/undercon￿dent for their
1Our results also apply to the labor market. In the labor market, workers and employers seek each other as
a working partner. Moreover, workers￿productivity may di⁄er according to the individual￿ s ability and ￿rms￿
productivity also di⁄er according to their capital.
2They also show that, even if ambiguities in words are excluded as much as possible, self-con￿dence occurs
in the course of experimentation.
3In such a case, individuals must invest in each component of charm to maximize their own charm before
they enter the market. This assumption is also along the lines of those by Burdett and Coles (2001), where
individuals increase his/her own pizzazz (charm) before they participate in the marriage market. Moreover,
assuming that some individuals disagree about the contribution of each element of charm to e⁄ective charm,
they overestimates or underestimates their own charm.
2own type. An agent who has self-con￿dence behaves just like the type to which he/she
believes that he/she belongs to and chooses the best strategy. All other singles, except people
who have self-con￿dence, are rational and recognize their own types correctly. According to
Burdett and Coles (1997), singles of either sex are partitioned into classes, and sorting arises
in their framework. They term this sorting as a special kind of positive assortative mating.
Positive assortative mating is a positive association in sorting the values of a partner￿ s charm.
Considering self-con￿dence, this two-sided aspect of the problem generates interesting results.
The results that we obtained are as follows. In our model, for simplicity, we assume that
there are three types of men/women according to charm: high type, middle type and low
type. First, to clarify the e⁄ect of self-con￿dence, we derive the conditions under which the
economy is at a perfect sorting equilibrium, where only persons of the same type marry, if
there are not any self-con￿dent agents as a benchmark.4 Next, we consider the case in which
there are some high type women who are undercon￿dent in the market. Undercon￿dent
high-type women believe that they belong to the middle type, and then accept o⁄ers from
middle-type men. Some middle-type men can marry high-type women with undercon￿dence
who turn down proposals from middle-type men if they do not underestimate their own
type. Consequently, middle-type men change their decision: they turn down proposals from
middle-type women and wait to meet high-type women with undercon￿dence. Given this,
middle-type women also change their optimal strategies. They accept low-type men, as they
prefer to marry rather than to remain single forever. Since low-type men can marry middle-
type women, low-type men reject low-type women. Then, low-type women cannot marry.
Thus, undercon￿dence by some high-type women changes the marital behavior of lower type
singles. Undercon￿dent high-type women marry earlier than in the case without undercon￿-
dence, since they accept o⁄ers from both high-type and middle-type men. Moreover, if the
proportion of undercon￿dent high-type women is su¢ ciently large, the total number of mar-
riages and the welfare generated by marriages increase compared to those of the benchmark
case.
Finally, suppose that there are some middle-type women who are overcon￿dent in the
market. They turn down proposals from middle-type men because women with overcon￿dence
believe that they belong to the high type. Thus, middle-type men change their marriage
behavior: they accept o⁄ers from low-type women. The reason for this is that some middle-
type men, who marry middle-type women in the benchmark case, are rejected by some
overcon￿dent middle-type women. Since low-type women are accepted by middle-type men,
low-type women also change their decision and reject low-type men. Therefore, low-type men
cannot marry. Overcon￿dent women cannot marry and keep seeking a marital partner forever
in the market.5 Moreover, if there are su¢ ciently few overcon￿dent middle-type women in
4According to our assumption of three types, if all singles are unbiased, marrying a member of the opposite
sex in the same class implies marrying a member of the opposite sex of the same type.
5In this paper, we assume that there is no learning. If agents learn their type from experience, there are
agents who identify their correct types and those who do not. Agents who have already learned their type
3the market, the total amount and the welfare of marriage rise relative to the case in which
all agents are rational. Even if sex is reversed, these results are con￿rmed.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic framework for our
analysis. In Section 3, we ￿rst show the consequence of the benchmark case, in which all agents
are rational. Next, we examine the undercon￿dence e⁄ect and the overcon￿dence e⁄ect and
contrast them with the benchmark result. In Section 4, we analyze social welfare generated
by marriage in the benchmark case, the undercon￿dence case, and the overcon￿dence case.
Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 The basic model
In this section, we present a basic model for our analysis in this paper.
As the marriage problem is two-sided, a two-side search model is assumed. Throughout,
we shall only consider a marriage market which is in the steady state. Consider a marriage
market with a large and equal number of men and women. Let N denote the participating
men/women in the marriage market. An agent in the market wishes to marry a member of
the opposite sex.
It is assumed that it always takes a time cost to look for a marriage partner. It is di¢ cult
for agents to meet someone of the opposite sex in the market; therefore, contact happens
every now and then. Let ￿ denote the rate at which a single individual contacts a member
of the opposite sex, where ￿ is the parameter of the Poisson process.6
It is assumed that singles are ex-ante heterogeneous, which implies that all singles have
the same ranking about a potential partner in the marriage market. Let xj denote the type
(charm) of a single man/woman j in the market and is assumed to represent the real number.
When both sexes meet, each agent can instantly recognize the opponent￿ s type xi and then
decide whether to propose or not. We assume that, if a couple marries, he/she obtains the
utility ￿ ow which equals the spouse￿ s type per unit of time and vice versa. Furthermore,
utilities are non-transferable: there is no bargaining for the division of the total marital
utility.
If both singles accept a proposal from an opponent, they marry and leave the marriage
market. A steady state requires that the exit rate into the market equal the entry rate into
the market for each type. In this paper, we assume that, if a pair marry and leave the market,
apply the same strategy as agents with no self-con￿dence, while agents who do not learn their types behave
as self-con￿dent agents in our model. Thus, the environment of a marriage market with learning agents is
qualitatively the same as that in a market without learning. Even if overcon￿dent middle-type women learn
from their experiences, there remain overcon￿dence women in the marriage market. Therefore, middle-type
men accept low-type women after all. Note that undercon￿dent high-type women are not able to learn about
their own type, since they marry before they identify their correct type.
6The encounter function is constant returns to scale: ￿ = M(N;N)=N = M(1;1), where M (N;N) is the
function which indicates the number of encounters between men and women per unit of time as a the function
of the stock of participating men and women. This function is assumed to be continuous and increasing in
both components.
4two identical singles enter the market at once (a￿clone￿ assumption).7 If at least one of the
two decides not to propose, they return to the marriage market and look for another marital
partner.
For the explanation, let us now regard agent j as a man and i as a woman. Suppose
that xj (xi) follows Fm (x) (Fw (x)), which denotes the distribution of types among men
(women) in the market. Both Fm (x) and Fw (x) need not be symmetric among men and
women. However, for simplicity, we assume that a certain agent￿ s xj corresponds to other
agent￿ s xi regardless of sex if singles belong to the same type. Moreover, we assume that all
singles correctly know Fm (x) and Fm (x).
Suppose that people live forever and divorce is not considered. Therefore, female agent
i who marries male agent j obtains discounted lifetime utility xj=r, where r is the discount
rate. Since agent i obtains utility bi per unit time while single, i earns utility bi￿, where ￿
is the small time interval. In addition, ￿i￿ is i￿ s probability that she will meet a man who is
willing to marry her. As Fm (xj) implies the probability that i will meet a man who generates
no more than xj per unit of time when they marry, the expected discounted lifetime utility












where Ei is the expectation operator given xj. Agent i will propose to agent if and only if
the utility she obtains is at least as great as Vi. The optimal strategy of agent i is obtained
from (1) given ￿i and Fm (xj). This best strategy has the feature of the reservation utility
level, that is, agent i will accept any o⁄er xj ￿ Ri from a man, where Ri = rVi.
3 Analysis
First, we consider a two-side search model with rational agents, which is a benchmark case. In
later sections, we study two cases with self-con￿dence, i.e., undercon￿dence or overcon￿dence,
and compare these two cases with the benchmark case.
3.1 Benchmark result
To simplify the analysis, suppose that there are three types of men/women according to
charm - high, middle and low. A participant in a marriage market belongs to one of these
7We can assume the exogenous in￿ ow of new singles which is assumed in Burdett and Coles (1997). This
exogenous entry ￿ ow is a more reasonable approach than that involving clones. However, to make the in￿ uence
of undercon￿dence or overcon￿dence more obvious, we adopt the clone assumption. If an exogenous in￿ ow is
assumed, a couple who marries and leaves the market changes the composition of types in the market. As a
result, the expected discounted utility of an unmatched single is changed. On the other hand, this externality
does not occur once the clone assumption is assumed.
5types and knows his/her own type correctly.8 Let xH=r denote the (discounted) utility of
marrying a high-type agent; similarly, xM=r and xL=r represent the utilities of marrying a
middle-type agent and a low-type agent, respectively. We assume that xH > xM > xL > 0.
Both sexes are assumed to obtain zero utility ￿ ow while they are single.
Let ￿H denote the proportion of high-type men/women in the marriage market. Similarly,
￿M and ￿L are the proportion of men/women who belong to the middle and low types,
respectively, where ￿H + ￿M + ￿L = 1. Assume that ￿i (i = H;M;L) of each sex are
symmetric among men and women in the market. We now focus on a steady state, where N
and ￿i (i = H;M;L) are given. In any equilibrium, all singles would like to marry a high-type
agent.
First, we investigate whether a high-type agent is willing to accept an agent of the opposite




























A high-type agent (i = H) meets another high-type agent of the opposite sex, and they
marry with probability ￿H. However, if a high-type agent meets an agent of the middle
or low type of the opposite sex with probability ￿M (￿L), he/she compares xM=r (xL=r)
and VH and then decides whether to marry or not. By this comparison, we can obtain
the reservation utility level of each type for rejecting other types. From this, 4 possible
steady state equilibrium outcomes can be considered when all singles are unbiased. These
outcomes depend on xi (i = H;M;L) holding all other parameters constant. In order to
make the in￿ uences of the self-con￿dence more obvious, we restrict our attention to the next
equilibrium in this article.
De￿nition 1 In the perfect sorting equilibrium, high-type agents marry within their group,
as do middle-type agents and low-type agents.
In a perfect sorting equilibrium, men and women in the same type marry.9 Therefore, we
may consider that high-type agents who marry within their group form the ￿rst cluster
of marriages, middle-type agents who marry within their group form the second cluster
of marriages, and low-type agents who marry within their group form the third cluster of
marriages in this equilibrium. We now de￿ne the following situation as a benchmark case:
if all agents are rational, the perfect sorting equilibrium occurs. The following proposition
shows the condition for the perfect sorting equilibrium when all singles are rational.
8If we consider a model with n types, our results do not change qualitatively. Then, the assumption of
three types is only for analytical simplicity.
9The perfect sorting equilibrium corresponds to the elitist Nash equilibrium, which is called in Burdett
and Coles (1997).
6Proposition 1 Suppose that all singles are rational. The economy is at the perfect sorting










Proof. I⁄ a high-type agent does not propose to a middle-type agent of the opposite sex,
VH > xM










On the other hand, when a high-type agent accepts a middle-type agent and turns down a
low-type agent, i.e., xM
r ￿ VH > xL
















H > V 2
H is satis￿ed, a high-type agent refuses a middle-type agent of the opposite sex.
This inequality V 1







If xM ￿ R￿
H, a high-type agent proposes to a middle-type agent.
Under inequality (3), we can obtain the condition for a middle-type agent to reject a






If xM < R￿
H and xL < R￿
M are satis￿ed, VH > xM=r > VM > xL=r > VL holds. The
parameter ￿￿H implies the arrival rate of proposals for an agent to contact a high-type
agent. If a high-type agent meets another high-type agent of the opposite sex, they marry.
Similarly, ￿￿M (￿￿L) is the rate at which an agent meets a middle- (low-) type agent. The
inequality (3) can be rewritten as the condition of the parameter ￿H. With constant ￿, if
(i⁄) ￿H is large enough (￿￿H > rxM
(xH￿xM)), a high-type agent turns down a middle- and
a low-type agent in the market (xM < R￿
H). Conversely, if (i⁄) there are su¢ ciently few
high-type agents (￿￿H ￿ rxM
(xH￿xM)), a high-type agent will accept a middle-type agent when
they meet (xM ￿ R￿
H ). If (i⁄) ￿￿H ￿ rxL
(xH￿xL) holds, a high-type agent is willing to
propose to any opposite sex (xL ￿ R￿
H ). A similar discussion can be done for the parameter
10If a high-type agent proposes to a middle-type agent but turns down a low-type agent (xL=r < VH
￿ xM=r), the high- and middle-type agents receive at least the same number of o⁄ers. Hence, VH ￿ VM, and
then we have VM ￿ xM=r. Namely, a middle-type agent wishes to marry another middle-type agent. Likewise,
if a middle-type agent accepts a low-type agent (VM ￿ xL=r), the middle- and low-type agents receive at least
the same number of o⁄ers. Then, a low-type agent also wants to marry another low-type agent.




(xM￿xL) , there is an equilibrium in which all singles obtain the same expected
discounted lifetime utility VL = VM = VH < xL
r . In this case, all types accept each other,
and then all singles marry the ￿rst agent of the opposite sex they meet.11
3.2 Undercon￿dence and Overcon￿dence
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of overcon￿dence and undercon￿dence into the
benchmark case. Suppose that all singles correctly understand the type distribution Fm (xj)
and Fm (xj). However, we assume that some women misunderstand their own types and
behave as if they were an agent in the type they think they belong to.12 Therefore, women
who are undercon￿dent or overcon￿dent decide the optimal strategy from (1) as the agents
in the type they think they belong to. Suppose that all singles know the proportion of the
women who are undercon￿dent or overcon￿dent in the marriage market. In order to make our
analysis explicit, in the following sections, we will consider the case in which the condition in
Proposition 1 is satis￿ed: the economy is at the perfect sorting equilibrium if there are not
any self-con￿dent agents. Then, we assume that xM < R￿
H and xL < R￿
M are satis￿ed.
3.2.1 Undercon￿dence
Now, let us suppose that some women in the high type believe that they belong to the
middle type. A proportion ￿HM (0 < ￿HM < 1) of high-type women are undercon￿dent.
They decide their own optimal strategy as middle-type women. Then, an undercon￿dent
high-type woman proposes to a high- or a middle-type man. On the other hand, middle-type
men expect to marry undercon￿dent women, as they know the existence of undercon￿dent
high-type women. Their optimal strategies are obtained in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that xM < R￿
H, xL < R￿
M and ￿HM (0 < ￿HM < 1) of high-type women
are undercon￿dent. If
￿￿H￿HMxH + ￿￿MxM
r + ￿￿M + ￿￿H￿HM
￿ RU1
Mm > (￿) xL;




Mm > (￿) xM;
a middle-type man rejects (accepts) a middle-type woman. In both of these cases, the reser-





11This equilibrium is the mixing Nash equilibrium, as called by Burdett and Coles (1999).
12This de￿nition follows that of Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005): agents have a subjective and egocentric
self-image.
8Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma means that, if some high-type women are undercon￿dent, a middle-type man￿ s
reservation utility level increases relative to that of the benchmark result. This is because a
middle-type man expects to marry an undercon￿dent high-type woman. Therefore, a middle-
type men decides whether to accept a middle- (low-) type women. The reservation utility level
of a middle-type man RU1
Mm > (￿) xL can be rewritten as ￿￿H￿HM > (￿)
(r+￿￿M)xL￿￿￿MxM
(xH￿xL) .
Further, we can rewrite RU2
Mm > (￿) xM as ￿￿H￿HM > (￿) rxM
(xH￿xM). 13 These inequalities
mean that, with constant ￿, ￿M, and ￿H, if (i⁄) ￿HM is large enough to satisfy ￿￿H￿HM >
rxM
(xH￿xM), a middle-type man rejects a middle-type woman, as he wishes to accept only an
undercon￿dent woman. Conversely, if (i⁄) ￿HM is small enough (￿￿H￿HM ￿ rxM
(xH￿xM)), a




(xH￿xM), a middle-type man accepts a middle-type woman and rejects a low-type
woman. If (i⁄) ￿HM is small enough to satisfy ￿￿H￿HM ￿
(r+￿￿M)xL￿￿￿MxM
(xH￿xL) , a middle-type
man accepts a low-type woman and then will propose to any woman in the market.
It is noteworthy that undercon￿dent high-type women marry earlier than rational high-
type women, since all singles would like to marry high-type agents. The time until marriage
of an undercon￿dent woman can be calculated, i.e., 1
(￿￿H+￿￿M). In contrast, if a high-type
woman recognizes her own type correctly, her time until marriage is 1
￿￿H. 14 Especially when
￿￿H￿HM > rxM
(xH￿xM), an interesting Nash equilibrium occurs. Then, we obtain the following
proposition. This equilibrium does not become the perfect sorting equilibrium due to the
existence of undercon￿dent women.
Proposition 2 Suppose that xM < R￿
H, xL < R￿
M, and ￿HM (0 < ￿HM < 1) of high-type
women are undercon￿dent. If ￿￿H￿HM > rxM
(xH￿xM), a middle-type man turns down a middle-
type woman (xM < RU2
Mm). Therefore, a middle-type woman accepts a low-type man. As a
result, a low-type man has the same reservation utility level as that of a middle-type agent in
the benchmark case, i.e., RU
Lm = R￿
M, and turns down a low-type woman. Hence, low-type
women cannot marry.
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, all agents except high-type agents are in￿ uenced by the undercon￿dence of a
high-type woman. Proposition 2 means that high-type agents (including undercon￿dent
women) form the ￿rst cluster of marriages, middle-type men and undercon￿dent women
form the second cluster, and middle-type women and low-type men form the third cluster. A
middle-type man prefers to continue to search for an undercon￿dent woman than to marry
13It is noteworthy that [xL(r +￿￿M)￿￿￿MxMw]=(xH ￿xL) < rxM=(xH ￿xM), from 0 < xL < xM < xH.
14When a middle-type man accepts a middle-type woman and rejects a low-type woman, a middle-type
man￿ s rate of contact with women whom he wants to marry is (￿￿H￿HM + ￿￿M). Then, the amount of time
until meeting that woman is 1=(￿￿H￿HM + ￿￿M). Since that in the benchmark case is 1=￿￿M, a middle-type
man￿ s time until marriage is shorter than that in the benchmark case. A similar discussion can take place
when a middle-type man accepts a low-type woman.
9a middle-type woman, as there are a su¢ cient number of undercon￿dent women. Then, a
middle-type woman decides whether or not to marry a low-type man. However, she always
proposes to a low-type man, since she prefers to marry than to remain single forever. Given
this, a low-type man has the reservation utility for rejecting a low-type woman. Moreover,
his reservation utility level becomes equal to that of a middle-type agent in the benchmark
case. Consequently, a low-type man turns down a low-type woman as RU
Lm = R￿
M > xL.
Then, although a low-type woman wishes to marry a low-type man, the opportunity never
arises.
3.2.2 Overcon￿dence
Here, suppose that some middle-type women misidentify their type. Let us assume that
proportion ￿MH (0 < ￿MH < 1) of middle-type women consider themselves to be high-type
women. Hence, their optimal strategies are R￿
H from (3). We have the next Lemma for a
middle-type man.
Lemma 2 Suppose that xM < R￿
H, xL < R￿
M, and ￿MH (0 < ￿MH < 1) of middle-type
women are overecon￿dent. If
xL < (￿) RO
M ￿
￿￿M (1 ￿ ￿MH)xM
r + ￿￿M (1 ￿ ￿MH)
;
a middle-type man rejects (accepts) a low-type woman. In this case, the reservation utility




This lemma means that overcon￿dence in some middle-type women lowers the reserva-
tion utility level of a middle-type man for a low-type woman. The reason for this is that
middle-type men, who marry middle-type women in the benchmark case, are turned down
by overcon￿dent middle-type women.
We can rewrite RO
M > (￿) xL as ￿￿M(1 ￿ ￿MH) > (￿) rxL
(xM￿xL). This means that, with
constant ￿ and ￿M, if (i⁄) ￿MH is small enough to ￿￿M(1￿￿MH) > rxL
(xM￿xL), a middle-type
man turns down a low-type woman due to his expectation to marry a rational middle-type
woman. Conversely, if (i⁄) ￿MH is large enough (￿￿M(1 ￿ ￿MH) ￿ rxL
(xM￿xL)), a middle-type
man accepts a low-type woman.
Moreover, if RO
M > xL, the middle-type man￿ s rate of contact with a woman whom
he wishes to marry is ￿￿M (1 ￿ ￿MH). Then, a middle-type man￿ s time (duration) until
meeting such a woman is 1
￿￿M(1￿￿MH). Their time until marriage is delayed since that in the
benchmark is 1
￿￿M . On the other hand, middle-type women with overcon￿dence can never
marry. The reason for this is that their o⁄ers are turned down by high-type men as long as
they are overcon￿dent.
10Given the above analysis, we can focus on an interesting Nash equilibrium and obtain the
next Proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that xM < R￿
H, xL < R￿
M and ￿MH (0 < ￿MH < 1) of middle-type
women are overcon￿dent. If ￿￿M (1 ￿ ￿MH) ￿ rxL
(xM￿xL), a middle-type man accepts a low-
type woman (RO
M ￿ xL). Consequently, a low-type woman has the same reservation utility
level as a middle-type woman RO
Lw = R￿
M and, therefore, refuses a low-type man. Hence, a
low-type man cannot marry.
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, this equilibrium is not the perfect sorting equilibrium. The implications of Propo-
sition 3 are as follows: high-type agents form the ￿rst cluster of marriages, middle-type men
and rational middle-type women form the second cluster, and middle-type men and low-type
women form the third cluster. Now, a middle-type man accepts a low-type woman, since
there are a su¢ cient number of overcon￿dent middle-type women in the marriage market
from Lemma 2. Although a low-type woman is willing to marry a middle-type man, she
may also decide whether or not to marry a low-type man. Hence, a low-type woman has the
reservation utility for turning down a low-type man. However, her reservation utility level be-
comes equal to that of a middle-type agent in the benchmark case. Then, a low-type woman
refuses a low-type man, and then a low-type man can never marry. Moreover, overcon￿dent
women cannot marry unless they identify their type correctly. It is noteworthy that the ￿rst
cluster of marriages is not in￿ uenced by overcon￿dence.
4 Welfare
It is meaningful to investigate the e⁄ects of self-con￿dence on social welfare. Undercon￿dence
or overcon￿dence may improve the welfare of the economy relative to the benchmark case.
We investigate the amount of marriages and their welfare at any point in time.
First, we show welfare for the case in which all players are rational as the benchmark.
Next, we investigate the welfare in the cases of undercon￿dence and overcon￿dence and
contrast these two cases with the benchmark case.
4.1 Benchmark result
Suppose that all agents are rational in a marriage market. As xM < R￿
H and xL < R￿
M, high-
type, middle-type, and low-type agents marry within their groups. As a result, high-type
agents form the ￿rst cluster of marriages, middle-type agents form the second cluster, and
low-type agents form the third cluster from Proposition 1. Now, a high-type man/woman
meets a high-type woman/man with probability ￿￿H, and there are ￿HN number of high-
type men/women in the market. Then, the number of marriages among high-type agents in a
11market is ￿￿2
HN. In the same way, we obtain the number of marriages of middle-type ￿￿2
MN
and low-type ￿￿2





Moreover, we explore welfare. If a high-type man marries a high-type woman, each of them
obtains the utility of marriage xH. Hence, the aggregation of high-type agents￿utilities from
marriage is 2￿￿2
HxHN. Similarly, we obtain 2￿￿2
MxMN for the middle type and 2￿￿2
LxLN





In the following subsections, we introduce self-con￿dence into the marriage market.
4.2 Undercon￿dence
Suppose that ￿HM (0 < ￿HM < 1) of high-type women are undercon￿dent in the market
and xL < R￿
M ￿ xM < RU2
Mm holds. Then, we restrict our attention to the case in
which ￿HM 2 ( rxM
￿￿H(xH￿xM);1) in this subsection. High-type men marry high-type women
(including undercon￿dent women) in the ￿rst cluster, middle-type men marry undercon￿dent
high-type women in the second cluster, and low-type men marry middle-type women in the
third cluster from Proposition 2. A high-type man meets a rational high-type woman with
probability ￿(1 ￿ ￿HM)￿H and an undercon￿dent woman with ￿￿HM￿H. Since there are
￿HN number of high-type men, the number of marriages for them is ￿￿2
HN. A middle-type
man meets an undercon￿dent women with probability ￿￿HM￿H. As there are ￿MN number
of middle-type men in a steady state, the number of marriages for them is ￿￿HM￿H￿MN. In
the same way, we obtain the number of marriages for low-type men ￿￿M￿LN. 15 Therefore,
we obtain the total number of marriages
TU = ￿(1 ￿ ￿HM)￿2
HN + ￿￿HM￿2
HN + ￿￿HM￿H￿MN + ￿￿M￿LN;
= ￿￿2
HN + ￿￿HM￿H￿MN + ￿￿M￿LN; (7)
and social welfare,
WU = 2￿￿2
HxHN + ￿￿HM￿H￿M (xH + xM)N + ￿￿M￿L (xM + xL)N: (8)
Next, we contrast the number of marriages and welfare in the case of undercon￿dence with
those in the benchmark case. The next lemma shows the necessary and su¢ cient condition
15By the same procedure, the number of marriages for rational high-type women is ￿(1￿￿HM)￿
2
HN. Like-
wise, that for undercon￿dent women is ￿(￿H +￿￿M)￿HM￿HN, and that for middle-type women is ￿￿M￿LN.
Then, the total number of marriages for women corresponds to (7).
12under which undercon￿dence raises the total number of marriages.
Lemma 3 Suppose that xL < R￿
M ￿ xM < RU2
Mm and ￿HM of high-type women are under-
con￿dent. I⁄
￿HM > (￿) ￿UT ￿
￿2




the number of marriages of an economy with undercon￿dence is higher (lower) than the
benchmark result, i.e., TU > (￿) T￿.
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma means that, if there are enough (few enough) undercon￿dent women (￿HM >
(￿) ￿UT), the number of marriages is higher (lower) in an economy with undercon￿dence
women than in the benchmark economy. This threshold point depends only on ￿i (i =
H;M;L). It is noteworthy that ￿UT > 0 as the numerator of ￿UT is always positive. Whenever
￿UT > 1, ￿UT > ￿MH must hold. In this case, the number of marriages is not related with
the proportion of undercon￿dence ￿MH.16
The number of marriages for the ￿rst cluster has the same value as the benchmark case.
However, that for the second cluster depends on ￿HM and ￿i (i = H;M) in the marriage
market. I⁄ ￿HM > (<) ￿UT
2 ￿ ￿M=￿H, there are more (fewer) undercon￿dent women
than middle-type women.17 Hence, the number of marriages for the second cluster increases
(decreases). Whenever ￿M > ￿H, then ￿UT
2 > 1 > ￿HM. Therefore, the number of mar-
riages for the second cluster decreases under any values of ￿HM. On the other hand, that
of the third cluster depends on only ￿i (i = M;L) independently of the proportion of un-
dercon￿dent women. If (i⁄) ￿M > (￿) ￿L, the number of marriages for the third cluster
increases (decreases) from that of the benchmark case.18 Moreover, ￿M > (￿) ￿L means
that ￿UT
2 > (￿) ￿UT holds. Therefore, if ￿M > (￿) ￿L and ￿HM > (<) ￿UT
2 , both the
number of marriages for the second cluster and that for the third cluster increase (decrease).
Consequently, the total number of marriages increases (decreases).19
The next proposition shows the condition of raising (decreasing) the welfare from mar-
riage.
16For instance, if ￿H > ￿M > ￿L, then ￿
UT > 1 > ￿HM and T
U > T





2 also corresponds with the threshold for increasing the number of marriages for middle-type
men. If ￿
UT
2 < (￿) ￿HM, the number of marriages for middle-type men is raised (lowered) relative to the
benchmark case.
18If ￿M > (￿) ￿L, the number of middle-type women is lowered (raised), and that of low-type men is raised
(lowered) in the third cluster.
19Consider the case in which ￿M > ￿L. Hence, the number of marriages for the third cluster increases relative
to that in the benchmark case. If ￿M=￿H > ￿HM > ￿
UT, that for the second cluster decreases. However, the
total number of marriages increases. This is because the increasing e⁄ect on the number of marriages due to
the third cluster is larger than the decreasing e⁄ect due to the second cluster. If ￿M=￿H > ￿
UT > ￿HM, the
total number of marriages decreases. At this time, the increasing e⁄ect by the third cluster is smaller than
the decreasing e⁄ect by the second cluster. Similar discussions can be carried out for ￿
UT > ￿HM > ￿M=￿H
and for ￿
UT > ￿M=￿H > ￿HM in the case in which ￿M < ￿L:
13Proposition 4 Suppose that xL < R￿
M ￿ xM < RU2
Mm and ￿HM of high-type women are
undercon￿dent. I⁄
￿HM > (￿) ￿UW ￿
￿2
L2xL ￿ ￿L￿M (xL + xM) + ￿2
M2xM
￿H￿M (xH + xM)
; (10)
the welfare of an economy with undercon￿dence is higher (lower) than the benchmark result,
i.e., W￿ < (￿) WU.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 implies that, if there are enough (few enough) undercon￿dent women in the
steady state (￿HM > (￿) ￿UW), the welfare increases (decreases) by undercon￿dence relative
to the benchmark case. The threshold for increasing the number of marriages depends only on
the distribution of types ￿i (i = H;M;L), whereas that for increasing the welfare generated
by marriage depends not only on ￿i but also on the utility of marrying a member of a type
xi (i = H;M;L). Hence, an increase in the number of marriages does not necessarily mean
an increase in welfare.
Here, we discuss the overall e⁄ect of undercon￿dence on the welfare from marriage and
compare an economy with undercon￿dence with the benchmark economy. High-type agents,
except undercon￿dent women, are not in￿ uenced by undercon￿dence. The welfare of low-type
women is always lowered, who cannot marry in the economy with undercon￿dent women.
In contrast, the undercon￿dent women who marry middle-type men obtain lower utilities
than rational women. However, their number of marriages increases, since they accept not
only high-type but also middle-type men.20 Consequently, the welfare of undercon￿dent
women is always higher than that in the benchmark case. The welfare of middle-type men
depends on ￿HM, xi and ￿i (i = H;M). Middle-type men can get higher marital utilities
than those in the benchmark case. I⁄ there are enough (few enough) undercon￿dent women
(￿HM > (￿) xM￿M
xH￿H ), the welfare of middle-type men is raised (lowered). Then, if ￿HM > ￿UT
2 ,
middle-type men can marry undercon￿dent women quickly, and their marriages and welfare
increase.21 If there are not many undercon￿dent women (xM￿M
xH￿H < ￿HM ￿ ￿UT
2 ), middle-type
men￿ s marriages are delayed, and then the number of their marriages decreases. However, in
this case, since they can obtain su¢ ciently large marital utilities, their welfare is improved
relative to that in the benchmark case. In addition, if (i⁄) xM￿M > (￿) xL￿L, the welfare
of middle-type women is lowered (raised), whereas that of low-type men is raised (lowered).
If the di⁄erence between xM and xL is large enough (xM￿M > xL￿L and ￿M ￿ ￿L), the
number of marriages for the third cluster is lowered, but the welfare of that cluster is raised
20The number of marriages for undercon￿dent women is always raised, including that for undercon￿dent
women who marry high-type men. However, that of undercon￿dent women who marry not middle-type men
but high-type men is included in the number of marriages for the ￿rst cluster. That of undercon￿dent women
who marry middle-type men is included in the number of marriages for the second cluster.
21I⁄ ￿HM > (￿) ￿
UT





2 . However, xM￿M > xH￿H is necessary for
xM￿M
xH￿H < 1:
14by the marital utilities. However, the welfare of the third cluster is lowered if ￿M ￿ ￿L, or if
xM￿M < xL￿L. In the case of ￿M ￿ ￿L, the decline in the welfare of middle-type women is
larger than the increase in that of low-type men. In the case of xM￿M < xL￿L, the increase
in the welfare of middle-type women is much smaller than the decrease in that of low-type
men, since there are many more low type men than middle type women. Therefore, the
welfare of the third cluster is lowered in both of these cases.
I⁄ the numerator of ￿UW is positive and smaller than the denominator, the threshold
value ￿UW is in (0;1).22 However, ￿UW cannot be in (0;1). At this time, the welfare is
increased or decreased by the value of both ￿i and xi rather than by the proportion of
undercon￿dence ￿HM in the market. Whenever the numerator of ￿UW is negative, then
￿HM > 0 > ￿UW holds. Therefore, the welfare from marriage is always better under any ￿HM.
However, it is necessary that ￿L > ￿M for the negative numerator of ￿UW.23 In contrast,
if the numerator of ￿UW is larger than the denominator, then we obtain ￿HM < 1 < ￿UW.
Then, the welfare from marriage is always worse under the any proportion of undercon￿dent
women.24 Of course, ￿HM > (￿) ￿UW does not contradict xM < RU2
Mm or ￿HM > (￿) ￿UT.
If the distribution of types is the discrete uniform distribution, the next corollary is
straightforward by Lemma 3 and Proposition 4. Once the discrete uniform distribution are
assumed, the threshold proportion ￿UW depends only on the marital utilities.
Corollary 1 Suppose that xL < R￿
M < xM < RU2
Mm, ￿MH of middle-type women are overcon-
￿dent. Moreover, we assume that the distribution of types is the discrete uniform distribution:
￿L = ￿M = ￿H. In this case, the total number of marriages of the economy with undercon-
￿dence is more than the benchmark result: T￿ < TU. I⁄ ￿HM > (￿) ￿uw = xL+xM
(xH+xM), the
social welfare of the economy with undercon￿dence is higher (lower) than the benchmark case:
W￿ < (￿) WU.
Proof. See Appendix.
The number of marriages and the welfare in the ￿rst cluster are the same values to those
of the benchmark case. The number of marriages for the third cluster has also the same
values as the benchmark case, since the proportion of middle-type agents is equal to that of
low-type agents. However, the number of marriages for the second cluster always decreases
by undercon￿dence as ￿H￿HM < ￿M. From these results, the total number of marriages
always decreases.
The welfare of high-type agents except undercon￿dent women is not in￿ uenced by the
undercon￿dence. That of undercon￿dent women is always higher than the benchmark case
since they accept not only high-type but also middle-type men. The welfare of low-type
women is always lowered. I⁄ there are enough (few enough) undercon￿dent women (￿HM >
22For some examples, see Example 1 in Appendix.
23For example, when xM = 15xL and ￿L = 4￿M, the numerator of ￿
UW becomes negative.
24For instance, if ￿L > ￿M
(xL+xM)
2xL and ￿M > ￿H
(xH+xM)
2xM , we have ￿
UW > 1.
15(￿) xM
xH ), the welfare of middle-type men is raised (lowered). These results are similar to those
in Proposition 4. However, the welfare of middle-type women is always lowered since they
marry low-type men. Whereas, that of low-type men is always raised compared to the bench
mark case. However, the increase in the welfare of middle-type women and the decline in the
welfare of low-type men are just o⁄set. Therefore, the social welfare is not in￿ uenced by the
third cluster of marriages. The overall e⁄ect of undercon￿dence on the social welfare depends
on the threshold value ￿uw. If the di⁄erence among marital utility xi (i = H;M;L) is large
(small) enough, ￿uw is close to zero (one).25 Then, a small (large) amount of undercon￿dent
women can improve the social welfare from marriage.26
4.3 Overcon￿dence
Suppose that ￿MH (0 < ￿MH < 1) of middle-type women are overcon￿dent in the market.
They believe that their type is the high type. All singles, except women who are overcon￿dent,
correctly identify their types. Let us now assume that RO
M ￿ xL (< R￿
M ￿ xM < R￿
H) and,
therefore, we focus on the case in which ￿MH 2 (
￿￿M(xM￿xL)￿rxL
(xM￿xL)￿￿M ;1). Hence, high types
marry within their group (they form the ￿rst cluster), and middle-type men marry rational
middle-type (they form the second cluster) and low-type women (they form the third cluster)
as in Proposition 3. Overcon￿dent women and low-type women cannot marry. Therefore, we
obtain the number of marriages,
TO = ￿￿2
HN + ￿(1 ￿ ￿MH)￿2
MN + ￿￿M￿LN; (11)
and the welfare from marriage,
WO = ￿￿2
H2xHN + ￿(1 ￿ ￿MH)￿2
M2xMN + ￿￿M￿L (xM + xL)N: (12)
Furthermore, we contrast these results in the case of overcon￿dence with those in the
benchmark case.
Lemma 4 Suppose that RO
M ￿ xL < R￿
M ￿ xM < R￿
H and ￿MH of middle-type women are
overcon￿dent. I⁄
￿MH < (￿) ￿OT ￿




the number of marriages of the economy with overcon￿dence is more (less) than the benchmark
result, i.e., T￿ > (￿) TO.
Proof. See Appendix.
25If the di⁄erence between xH and xM is large (small), rxM=[￿￿H (xH ￿ xM)](< ￿HM) also becomes small
(large).






16This lemma means that, if there are few enough (enough) overcon￿dent women (￿MH ￿
(>) ￿OT), the number of marriages increases (decreases) relative to the benchmark case. It
is noteworthy that ￿OT < 1 always holds. However, it is necessary and su¢ cient for ￿OT
> 0 that there be more middle-type agents than low-type agents (￿M > ￿L). If ￿M < ￿L,
then ￿MH > 0 > ￿OT holds. That is to say, the number of marriages is always worse under
any ￿MH. The number of marriages for the ￿rst cluster has the same value as that for the
benchmark case. However, that for the second cluster is always worse, since middle-type
men are turned down by overcon￿dent women. On the other hand, that for the third cluster
depends on the distribution of types ￿i (i = M;L). Now, low-type women reject low-type
men and wait for middle-type men. Then, if (i⁄) ￿M < (￿) ￿L, the number of marriages of
the third cluster is worse (better). Therefore, in order to increase the number of marriages,
￿M > ￿L is necessary.
The next proposition shows the condition for raising (decreasing) the welfare from mar-
riage.
Proposition 5 Suppose that RO
M ￿ xL < R￿
M ￿ xM < R￿
H and ￿MH of middle-type women
are overcon￿dent. I⁄
￿MH < (￿) ￿OW ￿





the welfare of the economy with overcon￿dence is higher (lower) than that in the benchmark
case, i.e., W￿ > (￿) WO.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 5 is as follows: if (i⁄) there are a small (large) enough
number of overcon￿dent women (￿MH < (￿) ￿OW), the welfare from marriage is better
(worse) due to overcon￿dence relative to that in the benchmark case. Whereas ￿OT depends
only on ￿i (i = M;L), ￿OW depends not only on ￿i (i = M;L) but also on the marital utility
xi (i = M;L). Similarly to Proposition 4, it is necessary and su¢ cient for ￿OW 2 (0;1) that
the numerator be smaller than the denominator and that the numerator be positive. If the
positive numerator is larger than the denominator in (13), then ￿OW > 1 > ￿MH holds. In
this case, the welfare of the economy with overcon￿dent women is always higher than the
economy of the benchmark case. If ￿HM > 0 > ￿OW holds, the welfare from marriage is
always worse under any value of ￿MH.27 It is noteworthy that ￿MH > (<) ￿OW does not
contradict xM < RU2
Mm and ￿MH > (<) ￿OT.
Let us discuss now the overall e⁄ect of overcon￿dence on the welfare and compare the
economy with overcon￿dence with the benchmark economy. The welfare of marriage to
27However, ￿MH ￿
rxL￿￿(xM￿xL)￿M
(xM￿xL)￿￿M is satis￿ed from the assumption R
O
M ￿ xL.
17rational middle-type women has the same value to that of the benchmark case.28 However,
the welfare of overcon￿dent women and that of low-type men in an overcon￿dent economy
are always worse, since they cannot get married. The welfare of marriages of middle-type
men depends on ￿MH, xi and ￿i (i = M;L). The refusals by overcon￿dent women lower
the welfare of middle-type men. However, middle-type men accept both middle-type and
low-type women in an economy with overcon￿dence. Then, if there are many more low-type
women than overcon￿dent women (xL￿L > xM￿M￿MH), the number of marriages for middle-
type men increases, and then their welfare also increases as a whole.29 Conversely, if there
are fewer low-type women than undercon￿dent women (￿L < ￿M￿MH), or, if the marital
utility xM is larger enough than xL (xL￿L < xM￿M￿MH) under ￿L ￿ ￿M￿MH, the welfare
of middle-type men is worse due to overcon￿dence relative to that in the benchmark case.
The welfare of low-type women increases if xM is su¢ ciently larger than xL (xL￿L < xM￿M)
under ￿M < ￿L, or if ￿M ￿ ￿L.30 In contrast, if there are many more low-type agents than
middle-type agents (xL￿L > xM￿M), the welfare of low-type women is worse relative to that
in the benchmark case. From these results, if ￿MH ￿ ￿OW and the marital utility xM is
larger enough than xL (xM￿M > xL￿L > xM￿M￿MH), the social welfare increases. The
reason for this is that the e⁄ects which raise the welfare of middle-type men and low-type
women are larger than the above e⁄ects, which lower welfare.
If the distribution of types is a discrete uniform distribution, the next corollary is obtained.
Similarly to Corollary 1, the threshold proportion ￿OW depends only on the values of the
marital utility of each type.
Corollary 2 Suppose that RO
M ￿ xL < R￿
M ￿ xM < R￿
H, ￿MH of middle-type women are
overcon￿dent. Moreover, we assume that the distribution of types is the discrete uniform
distribution: ￿L = ￿M = ￿H. In this case, the total number of marriages decreases compared
to the benchmark result: T￿ > To. I⁄ ￿MH > (<) ￿ow ￿ xM￿xL
2xM , the social welfare of the
economy with overcon￿dence is lower (higher) than the benchmark case: W￿ > (<) WO.
Proof. See Appendix.
The number of marriages and the welfare for the ￿rst cluster are the same as those of
the benchmark case. The number of marriages for the third cluster also has the same values
as those of the benchmark case. However, the number of marriages for the second cluster is
always lower in an overcon￿dent economy than in the benchmark economy. This is because
there are some overcon￿dent women in the middle type who reject the proposals of middle-
type men. Therefore, the total number of marriages is always lowered by overcon￿dent
women.
28The number of marriages to rational middle-type women also has the same value to that of the benchmark
case.






30The number of marriages for low-type women is raised (lowered) if ￿M > (￿) ￿L.
18The welfare of high-type agents and that of rational middle-type women is the same value
as those in the benchmark case. The welfare of overcon￿dent women and that of low-type
men in the overcon￿dent economy are always worse. If (i⁄) the proportion of overcon￿dent
women is small (large) enough ( xL
xM > (￿) ￿MH), the welfare of middle-type men increases
(decreases) on the whole. This is because that middle-type men accept both middle-type and
low-type women.31 These results are similar to those in Proposition 5. However, the welfare
of low-type women is always better relative to the benchmark case as they can obtain higher
marital utility. Therefore, the overall e⁄ect on the social welfare depends on the threshold
value ￿ow. If the di⁄erence between xM and xL is small enough, ￿ow is close to zero.32 Then,
a small number of overcon￿dent women decrease the social welfare relative to the case in the
benchmark economy. In this case, low-type women cannot obtain large marital utility, since
the di⁄erence between xM and xL is relatively small. If the di⁄erence between xM and xL
is su¢ ciently large, ￿ow is close to 1
2 and xL
xM is close to 0. In this case, even if overcon￿dent
women are enough to satisfy xL
xM < ￿MH < ￿ow, the social welfare can improve. The reason
for this is that low type women obtain the large marital utility from the marriage to middle
type men although the welfare of middle type men decreases.
5 Concluding remarks
A person often overvalues or undervalues his/her own type (charm), as early research on
psychology and behavioral economics has shown. In this paper, we investigated the in￿ uence
of self-con￿dence on a marriage market, which is a two-sided search model. Considering self-
con￿dence, this two-sided aspect of the problem generates a signi￿cant interest. We show
that the self-con￿dence of some single individuals (overcon￿dence or undercon￿dence) a⁄ects
not only themselves but also the marital behavior of other rational singles when rational
singles coexist with overcon￿dent or undercon￿dent singles in the marriage market. A single
individual who is overcon￿dent or undercon￿dent is always worse o⁄than if he/she is rational.
If there are some undercon￿dent high-type women in the marriage market, low-type women
cannot marry low-type men, who primarily propose to them. On the other hand, if there
are some overcon￿dent middle-type women, low-type men cannot marry low-type women,
who accept them in the case where all agents are rational. However, if there are enough
undercon￿dent women or if there are su¢ ciently few overcon￿dent women in the marriage
market, the social welfare increases by the existence of agents with self-con￿dence relative
to the economy without self-con￿dence. It is noteworthy that, even if sex is reversed, these
results are con￿rmed.
31The number of marriages of middle-type men is always raised. However, that of middle type men who
marry rational middle type women is included in in the number of marriages for the second cluster. That of
middle type men who marry a low type women is included in the number of marriages for the third cluster.
32At this time,
xL
xM is close to 1, and then
xL
xM > ￿
ow holds. If ￿MH is small but
xL
xM > ￿MH > ￿
ow,
overcon￿dent women decreases the social welfare relative to the benchmark economy. In this case, though the
welfare of middle type men increases, low type women cannot obtain large marital utility.
19This framework can be expanded. The model can be enriched to incorporate continuous
types and to allow learning of agents with self-con￿dence. Our results also apply to the labor
markets. In the labor market context, workers and employers seek each other as working
partners. Moreover, workers￿productivity may di⁄er according to individuals￿ability, and
￿rms￿productivity di⁄er according to their capital.
All of our results require the assumption that there is egocentric self-con￿dence in the
marriage market. Especially, although it is possible to theoretically analyze undercon￿dence
in our model, overcon￿dence is a more popularly studied biased behavior than undercon￿-
dence in economic and psychological literature. By investigating experimental evidence of
self-con￿dence in two-sided search, we will have a realistic marital behavior and a situation
with self-con￿dence.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 It is noteworthy that a rational high-type agent turns down a middle-
type and a low-type agent from xM < R￿
H. First, let us consider whether a middle-type man
is willing to marry a low-type woman. His reservation utility for a low-type woman can be
obtained as follows: if a middle-type man turns down a low-type woman, i.e., xM=r ￿ VM >





































M > V 2
M means that
￿￿H￿HMxH + ￿￿MxM
r + ￿￿M + ￿￿H￿HM
￿ RU1
Mm > xL:
If xL ￿ RU1
Mm, a middle-type man accepts a low-type woman. Compared with the benchmark




(￿￿￿M (xH ￿ xM) ￿ rxH)￿H￿HM
(r + ￿￿H￿HM)(r + ￿￿M)
< 0
is obtained from xH > xM:
Next, we consider whether a middle-type man wishes to marry a middle-type woman.










If a middle-type man proposes to a middle-type woman (xM=r > VM ￿ xL=r), his value
function becomes (14). Hence, from V 3






If xM ￿ RU2
Mm, a middle-type man accepts a middle-type woman. RU2
Mm > RU1
Mm as V 3
M >
xM
r > V 1
M. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2 As a middle-type woman is rejected by a middle-type man,
her option is to marry or to reject a low-type man. If she turns down a low-type man, her
expected discounted lifetime utility is Vm = 0. Therefore, a middle-type woman proposes to







Once a low-type man knows that he can be accepted by a middle-type woman, his option
is to marry or to turn down a low-type woman. His optimal strategy can be obtained as
follows: if he proposes to a low-type woman, that is, V 1
Lm ￿ xLw




























M > xL, RU
Lm > xL. Therefore, a low-type man turns down a low-type woman.
As a result, low-type women are not accepted by any man and therefore never marry. It is
noteworthy that, when all single individuals are rational (unbiased), there is no reservation
utility of a low-type man. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2 The reservation utility of a middle-type man for a low type can be
calculated as follows: if a middle-type man turns down a low-type woman (VM > xL=r), his
value function becomes
rV 1







Conversely, when a middle-type man proposes to a low-type woman (VM ￿ xL=r),
rV 2












21holds. Hence, we have his reservation utility level for declining a low-type woman,
￿￿M (1 ￿ ￿MH)xM
r + ￿￿M (1 ￿ ￿MH)
￿ RO
M: (15)








Proof of Proposition 3 As a low-type woman can be accepted by a middle-type man,
she decides whether to accept or reject a low-type man. In this case, following the same






It is noteworthy that RO
Lm = R￿
M. As xL < R￿
M, xL < RO
Lm holds. Hence, a low-type
woman turns down a low-type man. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3 From (5) and ( 7),
TU ￿ T￿ = ￿N [￿L (￿M ￿ ￿L) + ￿M (￿H￿HM ￿ ￿M)] (16)
holds. Then,
TU R T￿ , ￿HM R
￿2





Proof of Proposition 4 From (6) and (8), we have
W￿ ￿ WU = ￿￿M [￿M2xM ￿ ￿H￿HM (xH + xM)]N
+￿￿L [￿L2xL ￿ ￿M (xL + xM)]N: (17)
Hence,
WU R W￿ , ￿HM R
￿2
L2xL ￿ ￿L￿M (xL + xM) + ￿2
M2xM
￿H￿M (xH + xM)
= ￿UW:
holds. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1 Substituting ￿L = ￿M = ￿H = ￿ into (16), we have T￿ ￿ TU =
￿N￿2 (1 ￿ ￿HM) > 0. For social welfare, we have W￿￿WU = ￿2￿N[(xL + xM)￿(xH + xM)
￿HM] from (17). Therefore, W￿ Q WU , ￿HM R xL+xM
(xH+xM) holds. ￿
22Proof of Lemma 4 From (5) and (11),
T￿ ￿ TO = ￿N
￿




holds. Then, we have
T￿ R TO , ￿MH R





Proof of Proposition 5 From (6) and (12),
W￿ ￿ WO = ￿N
￿
2xL￿2




W￿ R WO , ￿MH R





Proof of Corollary 2 Substituting ￿L = ￿M = ￿H = ￿ into (18), we have T￿ ￿ TO =
￿N￿MH > 0. For social welfare, we have W￿￿WO = ￿N[2xL+2xM￿MH ￿(xL+xM)] from
(19). Therefore, ￿HM R xM￿xL
2xM , W￿ R WO holds. ￿
Example 1 The following examples illustrate that the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for ￿UW 2 (0;1) can have meaningful interpretations.
￿ If the utility of marrying middle-type agents xM is approximately fourteen times smaller
than the utility of marrying low-type agents xL ( xM < (7 + 4
p
3)xL), the numerator
of ￿UW is positive independently of the values of ￿H, ￿M, and ￿L.
￿ If there are not fewer middle-type agents than low-type agents (￿M ￿ ￿L), the numer-
ator of ￿UW becomes positive with any constant xH, xM, and xL.
￿ If the distribution of types is ￿H > ￿M > ￿L with any constant xi (i = H;M;L), ￿UW 2
(0;1) holds.
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